Braun, M. et. al (2020). Inheritance tax, shareholder protection, and the market value of family firms: A cross‐country analysis

Ortiz, M., Carney, M., Duran, P., Braun, M., & Riutort, J. Inheritance Tax, Shareholder Protection, And The Market Value Of Family Firms: A Cross‐Country Analysis. Global Strategy Journal.

Abstract 

We examine the relationship among inheritance taxes, shareholder protection, and the family firms' market value. Drawing on the family firm, corporate governance, and institutional complementarities literature, we argue that inheritance taxes act as external corporate governance mechanisms for decoupling business families' socioemotional goals. However, this depends upon minority investor protections. In strong protection countries, the incentives for family self‐governance created by high inheritance taxes are offset by the loss of business family autonomy inherent in strong shareholder protection. Using a sample of 284 firms across 31 countries, we provide support for these arguments. Results suggest that inheritance and shareholder protection laws are substitutive external corporate governance mechanisms to align business family and nonfamily shareholders' interests.